This study aims to examine how each cohort's family formation is affected by labor market conditions experienced in youth in Japan. Although the deterioration in youth employment opportunities has often been blamed for Japan's declining fertility rates, the effect of slack labor market conditions on fertility is theoretically unclear. We estimate the effects of regional labor market conditions at entry to the labor market and contemporaneous conditions on fertility, controlling for nation-wide year effects and prefecture fixed effects, and find the following. First, high school-educated women who experienced a recession while entering the labor market are less likely to have children and tend to marry later. In contrast, a recession rather increases fertility among college-educated women. The overall impact of labor market conditions experienced in youth on family formation is relatively weak, compared to the substantial impacts on earnings and employment stability documented by existing studies. Second, the unemployment rate at entry to the labor market is positively correlated with the probability of having two or more children conditionally on having at least one child. Third, the contemporaneous unemployment rate is negatively correlated with marriage of women in the local labor market, although the correlation is weak and concentrated on the less educated group.
Introduction
In this paper we examine how Japanese women's fertility is affected by labor market conditions experienced in youth. As is the case in many countries, in Japan, the fertility rate has been falling for decades. At the same time, unemployment and non-regular employment among youth have been rising. Because of the concurrence of these events, the deterioration of youth employment has often been blamed for the declining fertility rate (e.g. Yamada, 2007; Matsuda, 2009) Economic theories, however, do not predict that deterioration in youth employment prospects necessarily leads to lower fertility rates. A recession can have a positive substitution effect because worse employment opportunities for women lower the opportunity costs of childbearing. Indeed, empirical studies using data from the United States have established that worse opportunities for women in the local labor market can actually increase marriage and fertility rates, and this effect tends to dominate the negative income effects that derive from a deterioration of male employment opportunities (Butz and Ward 1979 , Schultz 1994 , Blau, Kahn and Waldfogel 2000 , Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2004 , Kondo 2010 . 1 In countries with more rigid labor market structures, however, it may be more difficult for women to find a job after child-bearing, and thus there may be less room for inter-temporal substitution between market work and family activities. 2 Incidentally, the fertility rate is falling rapidly in such countries, including Japan and southern European countries. At the individual level, Lindo (2010) finds that a husband's job displacement accelerates child bearing in the short run but it reduces the total fertility in the long run, using data from the United States. Furthermore, Huttunen and Kellokumpu (2010) find similar effects in Finland. 2 Indeed, Gutiérrez-Domènech (2008) finds that a high unemployment rate delays marriage and fertility of Spanish women. She argues that potential mothers care not only of their current employment status but also in their expected possibilities to work afterwards. 3 As Yamada (2007) points out, another similarity between Japan and southern European 3 Another important factor peculiar to Japanese labor market is that labor market conditions in the year of graduation have very persistent effects on employment and earnings for the affected cohort. For example, a 1%-pt rise in the unemployment rate lowers employment rates and earnings of high school graduates of that year by 3% and 7%, respectively, for over 12 years (Genda, Ohta and Kondo 2010) . These estimates imply that the cohorts that entered the labor force during the economic stagnation in the late 1990s and the early 2000s will suffer substantial and permanent loss in terms of their lifetime income.
Such a loss in permanent income could have a different effect on fertility than more temporary fluctuation. On the one hand, a temporary decline in income may delay marriage and childbearing, in order to smooth consumption inter-temporarily, without changing the total number of children the couple would eventually have. On the other hand, a decline in permanent income may affect the total number of desired children and the number of people who will never have a child. In order to predict Japan's future demographic trends, it is very important to distinguish the log-term effect of labor market condition at entry from shorter-term effects from temporary fluctuations.
Existing studies using Japanese data vary significantly in their conclusions, depending on the data and methodologies used. Among the studies using Census data, on the one hand, cross-sectional analyses using Census 2000 data report a positive correlation between employment opportunities for young men and contemporaneous marriage and fertility rates (Ogawa 2003 , Ohta 2007 , Kitamura and Miyazaki 2009 On the other hand, Ogura and Dekle (1992) apply the first-difference method to prefecture-level panel data from Census 1970-85 data and find a negligible effect of men's earnings on marriage and fertility rates.
All of these studies report a modest negative effect of better labor market opportunities for countries is that unmarried youths tend to be allowed to depend financially upon their parents.
4 Ermisch and Ogawa (1994) show similar results using time series data. 4 women on marriage and fertility; therefore, the overall effect of a recession on marriage and fertility rates remains ambiguous. Furthermore, using Japanese General Social Surveys, Shimizu (2002) finds that a decrease in women's earnings raises fertility, whereas Higuchi, Matsuura, and Sato (2007) find that the prefecture-level active job opening to vacancy ratio (yuko kyujin bairitsu) does not affect the fertility of married women using data from the Japan Panel Study of Consumers. Lastly, Abe (1999) and Higuchi (2001) find that women who graduate from school in a year when labor demand is slack tend to marry and bear children earlier, while the contemporaneous unemployment rate delays marriage and childbearing.
Such a lack of consensus among existing studies can be attributed to the lack of an appropriate dataset that provides individual-level information on fertility and marriage history and has a sufficiently large sample size. We aim to overcome this limitation by constructing individual-level fertility history data from the Employment Status Survey (ESS), supplemented by prefecture-level panel data for marriage histories from the Census and Vital Statistics. These datasets are augmented with the regional unemployment rates. By exploiting geographical variation in unemployment rates, we control for nation-wide time trends in a flexible way. Further, the ESS's large sample size allows us to investigate the effect for subsamples divided by education. Another contribution of this study is that we control for nation-wide year effects and region fixed effects to obtain estimates that are more robust to trend changes. 5 We limit our sample to women because the effects of the unemployment rate on mobility and educational attainment, which are discussed in the Appendix, are not negligible for males in the ESS. 6 Our estimates suggest that, high school-educated women who experienced a recession 5 To our knowledge, Ogura and Dekle (1992) is the only existing study to employ the same strategy, but their analysis was limited to the contemporaneous relationship between labor market conditions and marriage and fertility behavior. In an earlier version, we have tried using the sample of men. The estimated effects of the unemployment rate on family formation were weaker, although these estimates may be subject to biases owing to endogenous mobility and educational attainment. 5 at entry to the labor market are less likely to have a child. In contrast, a recession increases fertility among college-educated women; this weak income effect among more highly educated women is consistent with existing evidence that income loss due to a recession at entry is smaller for college-educated men than for high-school educated men (Genda, Kondo and Ohta, 2010) . This positive effect for more educated women cancels out the negative effect for less educated women. Consequently, the overall impact of labor market conditions experienced in youth on family formation is weak. , despite the substantial losses in earnings and employment stability documented by the existing studies (e.g. Genda, Kondo and Ohta 2010 ).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews background statistics of the Japanese youth labor market, as well as demographic trends. The third section describes our data, while the fourth reports our empirical findings. The final section provides concluding remarks.
Background

Japanese youth labor market and demographic trends
The Japanese economy experienced prolonged stagnation in the 1990s and early 2000s.
Since Japanese firms prefer to reduce their number of new hires among school graduates rather than fire existing workers, the cost of this economic stagnation was borne disproportionately by young people who were transitioning from school to full-time work.
Consequently, macroeconomic conditions in the year of graduation have very persistent effects on one's subsequent employment and earnings. Genda, Kondo and Ohta (2010) show that a one percentage-point rise in the regional unemployment rate at graduation lowers earnings in the subsequent 12 years by 7% for high school-educated men and by 3% for college-educated men. For high school graduates, a one percentage-point rise in the 6 unemployment rate at graduation also lowers the employment rate by three percentage points for over a decade afterwards. This implies that the cohorts that entered the labor force in the 1990s and the early 2000s will suffer substantial and permanent loss in terms of their lifetime income.
At the same time, Japan has experienced a rapid fall in its fertility rate. The total fertility rate fell from approximately 1.8 in the early 1980s to below 1.3 in the mid-2000s, and Japan's fertility rate is currently among the lowest in the world. This fall in the fertility rate can be attributed to increase in the number of women who never marry. The average number of children borne by a married couple has stayed at around two since the 1970s, while the proportion of women aged 25-39 who are not married increased from 18% in 1985 to 36% in 2005, according to Census data. Moreover, according to the Vital Statistics Annual Report of 2003, less than 2% of all births were out of wedlock. Thus, it is believed in Japan that a decline in marriage leads to a decline in fertility.
This coincidence of timing leads to the argument that the deterioration in employment prospects for young men has accelerated the aging of the Japanese population-that is, economic stagnation has increased the number of young men who cannot earn enough to support their families, thus suppressing marriage and fertility rates. However, because the unemployment and fertility rates are sustaining secular trend changes, the observed negative correlation might have been a mere coincidence. Further, 7 It is often emphasized that the social norm in Japan expects men to support their spouse financially. According the Eleventh Japanese National Fertility Survey in 1997, women in Japan consider earning capacity one of the very important attributes of a prospective spouse. 7 the individual-level correlation between family formation and past employment status does not necessarily mean an aggregate effect of macroeconomic shocks experienced in youth, especially if some unobservable factors affect both labor supply and family formation. Therefore, the causal link between the unemployment rate and the fertility rate might be much weaker than it appears in aggregate time series. Hence, the rest of this paper explores the relationship between the unemployment rate and fertility with controls for nation-wide trends by including year dummies.
A simple model of fertility and implications
Let n denote the number of children, and Z denote a bundle of other commodity goods.
Suppose a woman's utility depends on n and Z only, i.e.
U=U(n, Z) …(1)
Assume that U is concave in n and in Z. Further, suppose that raising a children requires an input of t c units of time and P c unit of money. The price of Z is normalized to one. The woman could earn W per one unit of time if she is employed, and has other income (including her spouse's earnings) I. Letting t l denote the time she works in the market and T denote the total time endowed to her, her budget constraint can be written as follows:
Maximizing (1) given budget constraints (2) and (3) gives the following first order condition:
(4) implies that, when female wages are high (i.e. w is high), the desired number of children is low because of the high opportunity cost. This is the negative substitution effect from better labor market conditions for women. At the same time, if the total income is high, the optimal level of consumption Z should be also high, and thus the marginal utility of Z should 8 be low. Thus, an increase in total income will increase the optimal number of children. This is the positive income effect.
This simple model implies that a recession has two competing effects on fertility. One is the substitution effect from the lower wages for women: the lower opportunity cost of time input to children raises the fertility rate. The other is the income effect through the declined household income, which lowers the demand for children and thus lowers the fertility rate.
Which effect is stronger is an empirical question.
Furthermore, which effect is stronger depends on the persistence of the wage shock.
The model presented above is a static model, but in reality, money can be saved, so the income constraint (2) may not be binding within each period, whereas time constraint has to be met within each period because time can't be saved. Therefore, the more persistent the income shock is, the stronger the income effect works. In our framework, the unemployment rate at entry to the labor market affects permanent income and the contemporaneous unemployment rate is supposed to represent more temporary shocks.
Data
The ESS, our source of fertility history data, is conducted by the Statistics Bureau of Japan every five years; for this study, we use the surveys from 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007. As its name shows, the main purpose of the ESS is to grasp people's employment status. Thus it asks about employment status and, if employed, job characteristics and earnings. It also asks about the basic demographic characteristics of all adult household members, such as age, gender, and educational background. Furthermore, the ESS asks about marital status and the relationship of the household head to each adult within the household, as well as the ages of all children therein. These variables allow us to retrieve the fertility history of each adult woman in the ESS.
In construction of the fertility history data, we assume that all children younger than 18 years live with their mother, and that no woman younger than 18 or older than 45 years can have a child. Then, if a woman was 18-45 years old when a child in the same household was born, we assume that the woman is the child's mother. The Appendix describes the step-by-step process by which we dealt with households with multiple adult women; ultimately, the fertility histories of more than 99% of the women in the relevant age group are retrieved.
For the main analyses, we use data of women who were 33-37 years old at the time of survey. This cut-off threshold is a result of the trade-off between accuracy and the length of the period to cover. On one hand, since we cannot track childbirths that had occurred 18 or more years prior to the survey, we cannot capture the number of births to a woman who was 16 years old at the time of the birth and 34 years or older at the time of survey. On the other hand, given that the median age of mothers bearing their first children is 29, we cannot ignore births performed by women in their early thirties. Since teenage births account for less than 2% of all births in Japan, we set 37 as the maximum age of women to include; the lower cut-off is set to 33 so that each survey can cover 5 cohorts. Table 1a shows the summary statistics of data from the ESS. We divide the sample by educational background, because it affects the timing of marriage and fertility. One thing to note is that in Japan, junior college is a much more popular option for females than for males.
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In contrast, males are much more likely to go to a four-year college. Also, skipping and repeating grades very rarely occurs in Japan; thus, although the ESS asks only 8 Further, the category includes both regular junior colleges, which grant associate degrees, and technical colleges (kosen), which offer five-year programs that grant high school diplomas and associate degrees. In addition, some respondents had gone to two-year vocational schools (senmon gakko) and seemed to classify themselves as "junior college" graduates, probably because the certificates issued by such vocational schools are taken as being equivalent to associate degrees. about the highest degree completed in the four categories, we can calculate the age at graduation fairly accurately as follows: 15 for junior high school, 18 for high school, 20 for junior college, and 22 for college. Since the unemployment rate may affect enrolment decisions, we further discuss the effect of the regional unemployment rate on education attainment in the Appendix.
As mentioned, the median age of mothers at their first child's birth is 29. Figure 2 plots the age profile of the women who have at least one child, as well as the woman who have ever married from the annual panel at the prefecture level. As expected, women with lower levels of education attainment tend to have a child earlier. Further, a significant number of women have not had a child by their mid-thirties, especially those who had graduated from college.
As an index for labor market conditions, we use the regional unemployment rates for 10 regions, 9 as published in the annual report of the Labour Force Survey since 1974.
Since the prefecture-level unemployment rates are not available, we assign the same unemployment rate to each prefecture in the same region. The primary reason we use the regional unemployment rates despite this limitation is that, by using the same variable as Genda, Kondo and Ohta (2010) , we ensure that those unemployment rates had significant long-term effects on earnings and employment. This is important because, in order to merge the regional unemployment rate with fertility and marriage data, we have to assume that the region of residence at graduation or at a specific age is the same as the region of residence at the time of survey.
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Admittedly, there must be some measurement error; however, Genda, Kondo and Ohta (2010) demonstrate that such errors are not large enough to attenuate the 9 Hokkaido, Tohoku, Southern-Kanto, Northern-Kanto and Koshin, Hokuriku, Tokai, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku and Kyushu. Annual unemployment rates at the prefecture level had not been available until the survey redesign in 2002 because the sample size for small prefectures had not been large enough to calculate unemployment rates precisely.
The effect of unemployment rate on geographic mobility is discussed in the Appendix. 11 effects on earnings, even 12 years after graduation. The summary statistics are shown in Table 1b .
The main cause of declining fertility in Japan has been said to be the delay in marriage.
Unfortunately, however, the ESS does not provide any information regarding when the respondent married. Therefore, in order to assess the effect of on marriage timing, we construct panel data at the prefecture level from the Census and Vital Statistics.
Our analysis of marriage begins with data from the quinquennial Population Census for 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 , which provides total and never-married populations by each age, gender, and prefecture. 1990 and 2000 Census also provides information by educational background. Table 1c presents the summary statistics.
We impute data for inter-Census years from the Census and the Vital Statistics Annual Report as follows. The total population is interpolated solely based on the Census, by taking a weighted average of the previous and subsequent Census. The underlying assumption is that the age-specific migration rate does not jump at a certain age; this assumption is not very plausible for those younger than 25, because many people move at the ages of 18, 20, and 22 to enter college or start a job. Hence, our data include only people older than 25. The numbers of ever-married women are calculated by adding the number of marriages reported in the annual Vital Statistics to the ever-married population reported in the Census. For this reason, the ever-married population fluctuates with the number of marriages reported in the Vital Statistics. The Appendix describes our data procedure in more detail. Eventually, we have a panel dataset comprising the total and ever-married populations, by gender, prefecture, and year of birth, for the birth-year cohorts of 1956-1978. Table 1d shows the summary statistics.
Empirical findings
Fertility
Our purpose is to estimate the effects of unemployment rates both at entry to the labor market and at present on fertility. Specifically, we use the following two empirical models.
First, we estimate a linear probability model, which allows us to control for individual-level fixed effects for the analysis of contemporaneous unemployment rate. Then, we estimate a Cox's proportional hazard model, which is better fitted to the analysis of the unemployment rate at entry to the labor market.
Consider the following linear probability model:
. (5) where C ptyi takes 1 if person i has had a child by year t and 0 otherwise. Subscript p denotes the region of residence and y is the year of graduation. U C pt-1 is the contemporaneous unemployment rate (i.e. the unemployment rate in year t-1 in region p), and U E py is the unemployment rate that the individual faced at her entry to the labor market (i.e. the unemployment rate in year y in region p). δ p represents a region fixed effect, η y represents a nation-wide cohort effect, φ p t represents a region-specific linear trend, and μ i represents an individual fixed effect. The remaining random error is denoted as ε apt , which may be correlated within the region (i.e. standard errors should be clustered by region).
Note that, however, p and y, and thus U E py , do not vary over time for each individual.
Therefore, β cannot be identified if we control for individual fixed effects. Therefore, we first estimate the following regression to estimate α only with controls for individual fixed effects, i.e. we run the following regression:
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We use the linear probability model to avoid complication arising from using fixed-effects probit or logit model. In the working paper version, we tried a probit model without individual fixed effects. The results are qualitatively the same and also quantitatively close.
Next, we estimate β without controlling for individual fixed effects:
Furthermore, since the effect of the unemployment rate at entry may fade away over time, we estimate β separately for the ages of 26, 28, 30, 32 and 34. Also, we estimate all regressions for separately for different ages and educational backgrounds. We omit U C pt-1 here, but the point estimates of β do not change much if we control for U C pt-1 instead of region specific linear trend.
12
The first column of Table 2 reports the estimated effect of the unemployment rate in year t-1 on the probability of having a child in year t. Contrary to the common belief, the contemporaneous unemployment rate has a positive effect on the fertility rate for more educated women, and no effect for less educated women. The rest of Table 2 shows the estimated effect of the regional unemployment rate in the year of graduation on the probability of having ever had a child at the ages of 26, 28, 30, 32 and 34. The unemployment rate at graduation has statistically significant negative effects on the probability of having had a child by their mid thirties for less educated women. In contrast, the effect is much weaker and statistically insignificant for more educated women.
The second empirical model is the following Cox proportional hazard model:
where H is the hazard rate of having the first child. The baseline hazard, λ, is a function of age and stratified by birth year and educational back ground. This is equivalent to controlling for nation-wide cohort effects and calendar-year effects separately for each educational
Including all of U C pt-1 , U E py and the region-specific linear trend boosts standard errors and makes α unstable, probably because for each combination of (p, y, t) we observe only one set of (U C pt-1 , U E py ).
14 background. Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients α and β for all women and for two subgroups by educational background. Table 3a shows that the unemployment rate in the year of graduation delays the timing of first birth for female high school graduates. Also, the effect is positive for college (including junior college) graduates, although the coefficient is not statistically significantly distinct from 0. The effect of the contemporaneous unemployment rate also has opposite signs for the two groups, although not statistically significant.
Further, we allow α and β to vary with the woman's age, by taking interaction of unemployment rates with age category dummies. Figure 3 presents histograms of the simulated number of births for each age category and level of education, using the actual age-specific fertility rates and estimated coefficients reported in Table 2b .
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Overall, a recession decreases fertility for less educated women but increases fertility for more educated women. Since the negative effect for less educated women and the positive effect for more educated women cancel out each other, the aggregate effect of a recession on fertility is weak.
The positive effect for more educated women is consistent with the findings in the United States. For example, Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) show that women who have a child during a recession are on average better educated than women who have a child during a boom. Also, Kondo (2010) finds that a recession experienced in youth accelerates 13 The number of births when the unemployment rate at graduation rises by 1% = exp(β)*#actual births in the data *(1-simulated # births for the younger category)/ (1-actual # births for the younger category). The number of births when the contemporaneous unemployment rate rises by 1% = exp(α)*#actual births in the data. marriage and childbearing slightly, but it does not change the number of children eventually born. On the contrary, a recession experienced at entry to the labor market has a persistent negative effect on fertility for less educated women.
The opposite effect across educational background suggests that the positive substitution effect is stronger for more educated women, while the negative income effect is stronger for less educated women. The substitution effect might work stronger for more educated women because they are more likely to have a full-time regular job if they are single, and therefore the opportunity cost of maternity leave may be higher. Another possibility is that the income effect is weaker for more educated women because they tend to marry with more educated men, who suffer less from a persistent loss of earnings due to entering the labor market during a recession.
An alternative explanation is that the effect of the unemployment rate at entry is not caused by the decline in income but operates through the increase in non-regular employment.
14 Non-regular employment is more prevalent among less educated women than among more educated women: According to the ESS, 53.1% of employed women in their twenties with high school or less education are in non-regular employment, whereas only 28.0% of those with junior college or more education are on non-regular employment.
Also, it is known that the unemployment rate at entry to the labor market increases the probability of having a non-regular job in subsequent years (Kondo 2007, Genda, Kondo and Ohta 2010) . Moreover, at the individual level, non-regular employment and unemployment tend to delay marriage among Japanese women (Nagase 2002 Readers who are familiar with the ESS might wonder why we do not assess the effect of obtaining a regular fulltime job upon graduation directly, because ESS 2007 provides information of the first job after graduation. We have tried but found that the proportion of women who obtained a regular fulltime job within two years since graduation is about 50%, which is unrealistically low compared to other published statistics in Japan. Thus we did not use this information. non-regular jobs at the time of marriage tended to have fewer children than did those who had regular jobs or did not have jobs. This may be because, as shown by Imada and Ikeda (2006) , most non-regular employees are not eligible for maternity leave and have more difficulty in keeping their jobs after childbirth than do regular employees. Gutiérrez-Domènech (2008) argues that a similar mechanism leads to a negative effect of the unemployment rate on marriage and fertility in Spain, although she does not find the same pattern across educational background as we find for Japan. In addition to this lack of job security during the maternity leave, as Nagase (2002) speculates in the discussion of her results, regular full-time employment might have offered some sort of matching opportunity for young women and also pressured them to marry by a certain age. 15 Finally, we examine the effect on the probability of having two or more children.
Does the delay in the first childbirth lead to a lower probability of having a second child for high school or less educated women? Table 3 suggests that the answer is no. It shows that, conditional on having at least one child, the unemployment rate at graduation increases the probability of having the second child even for less educated women. This may be because women who experienced slack labor market conditions at entry to the labor market are less likely to be able to keep their full-time jobs after their first childbirths and thus the opportunity cost of having additional children is lower for them. 16 Nonetheless, we must 15 One might think that the lack of childcare is another cause of the negative effect of a recession, because more married women try to work part-time to compensate for declined income of their spouses during a recession. We have tried adding the number of children on the wait-list to public day care (taikijidou), although such data are available only for the 2000s and thus our finding is only suggestive. Nonetheless we find that, even though the shortage of childcare does discourage child bearing, the estimated effects of the unemployment rate do not change much. Imada and Ikeda (2006) show that female non-regular employees who are not eligible for a maternity leave tend to quit right before the birth of their first children. Since the rate of non-regular employment is strongly affected by labor market conditions in the year of graduation in Japan (Genda, Kondo and Ohta, 2010) , this implies that cohorts who face a slack labor market at entry to the labor market are less likely to continue to work at a full-time regular job after child-bearing. bear in mind that our sample is limited to those who were 33-37 years old at the time of survey, because we cannot track births that occurred more than 17 years prior to the survey.
Since 20 % of second and higher-order births are undertaken by women older than 33 years, the results presented in Table 6 should be considered as suggestive evidence.
Marriage
Let us first examine the contemporaneous correlation between the unemployment rate and family formation behavior by young women in the same region. Specifically, we obtain prefecture-level unemployment rate data, as well as data on the proportion of the married female population by age, from Census 1985-2005. The first panel of Table 2 shows the estimated coefficient of the male unemployment rate from the following double-fixed effect model:
where M apt is the proportion of married women in age category a in prefecture p in year t, and U pt is the male unemployment rate in prefecture p in year t. We use both the unemployment rate of all adult men and that of men in the same age group as the women. The year dummy, η, is included to control for changes in nation-wide trends, and the prefecture dummy μ controls for the time-invariant characteristics of each prefecture. As shown in Table 4a , the male unemployment rate does not have a statistically significant effect on the marriage rate of young women in the same prefecture.
Furthermore, we calculate the proportion of the married population by educational background (high school or less, junior college and college) from Census 1990 and 2000. Table 4b shows the correlation between the first difference of the male unemployment rate and that of the female marriage rate by educational background and age category, from the following linear regression:
As shown in Table 4b , the male unemployment rate has a modestly negative effect on marriage of women who had attained high school or lower levels of education. This implies that a recession affects women with different educational background in different ways.
Note that we do not include region-specific linear trend because we do not have the number of years many enough to do so. Although the results are, as shown later, consistent
with the results about fertility, we need to keep in mind that the estimates here might be biased by such region specific trends.
Next, let us examine the effect of the unemployment rate experienced upon entry to the labor market using the prefecture-birth year level data from the Census and Vital Statistics.
Since the data are aggregated to the prefecture level, we employ the following linear probability model instead of a probit or logit:
is supposed to be the unemployment rate at graduation. However, we cannot calculate the married population separately for each level of education because the Vital Statistics does not ask educational background. For this reason, we try the unemployment rates in the year when the cohort was 18, 20 and 22 years old as , p y U , and instead of splitting the sample by education, we include in X pty the ratio of women (or men) with no more than high school education. X pty also includes the male-to-female ratio in the population. In order to allow the coefficients to vary with age, we estimate (3) separately for each age a.
The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 5 . A recession at graduation from schools generally delays the marriage of the affected cohort of women. Moreover, the unemployment rate at graduation from high school has weaker at first but more persistent effect than the unemployment rate at graduation from college graduation. Yet, the effect is rather small; a one percentage point rise in the unemployment rate at entry to the labor market 19 lowers the probability of having ever married by the age of 35 by at most about 0.5 percentage points.
Overall, we find only modest evidence that deterioration in the employment opportunities of young workers have decreased the marriage of young women. The strong negative correlation observed from the time series data is likely spurious; i.e., a recession is not associated with a decline in the marriage rate. At the same time, we do not observe an acceleration of marriage timing due to a recession experienced in youth, which is observed in the United States. Our results are closer to the study by Gutiérrez-Domènech (2008) , who finds that a high unemployment rate delays marriage in Spain. Her interpretation of the negative effect of the unemployment rate on marriage formation is that potential mothers worry about future employment opportunities after child bearing. Although our data do not allow us to go beyond speculating on this matter, the same argument might hold in Japan, especially for less educated women who tend to be in non-regular employment and have difficulty in keeping a job during their maternity leave.
Conclusion
We have shown that a high regional unemployment rate and a low employment rate of the men in the same cohort lowers the probability of being married for young Japanese women. In contrast, the aggregate effect of local labor market conditions on fertility is subtle. However, a breakdown by educational background reveals that the effect of unemployment rate at entry to the labor market on fertility is negative for less educated women and positive for more educated women. The positive effect for more educated women is consistent with the substitution effect typically observed by existing studies in the United States. The negative effect for less educated women may be attributable to a stronger income effect, the lack of job security during the maternity leave, or the lack of 20 matching opportunities for non-regular female employees.
In any case, the overall effect of labor market conditions experienced in youth on family formation is weak, despite the well-documented persistent effect of labor market conditions at entry on subsequent employment and earnings. Although it might have delayed marriage timing slightly, the deteriorating employment prospects for young Japanese men is not likely to be the primary reason of the declining fertility. This result implies that, even though restoring the employment prospects of young Japanese is an important policy challenge on its own, it is unlikely to be an effective policy for increasing the fertility rate.
Appendix
A1 Total and ever-married population from the Census and Vital Statistics
For total population, for each prefecture and sex, we define the population of each age in This definition does not take into account different migration rates for different ages.
This omission may cause non-random measurement errors for the teens and the early twenties because many of them move from rural areas to large cities to enter college or start a new job, especially at the ages of 18, 20 and 22. Yet, we believe that such errors are negligible for the 21 population of age 25 or older; 17 therefore, we focus on marital status at the age of 25 or older.
For the ever-married population of unmarried, we use the number of marriages by age of the bride and groom registered in each prefecture, published annually as a part of the Vital Statistics, in addition to the never-married population by single age, sex and prefecture taken from the Population Census. Using these data, first, we subtract the number of marriages formed after the latest Census from the never married population reported in the Census. Let us call this "forward imputation." Second, we add the number of marriages to be formed by the next Census to the never married population reported in this next Census. Let us name this "backward imputation." Lastly, we take a weighted average of the forward and backward imputations. For example, the never-married population of age 28 in 1997 is calculated as follows:
1. Forward imputation: the never-married population of age 26 in 1995 -the number of marriages with 27-year-old brides in 1996 -the number of marriages with 28-year-old brides in 1997. 3. Weighted average: 0.6*forward imputation + 0.4* backward imputation.
17
For 1991-2005, we tried an alternative definition that uses the annual population estimates reported in jinko suikei nenpo. Since the annual estimated population is available only for five-year age categories, we decomposed each five-year age cell into five single-year age cells using the ratio obtained from nearest two Census waves. For example, the population of age 28 in 1997 is defined as follows: We confirmed that the difference between this alternative definition and the definition used in the main analysis is negligible for population older than 24.
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The ever-married population is equal to total population -never-married population.
For years prior to 1980, only the "backward imputation" is available because Census 1975 does not provide with the never married population by single age. Thus, we regress the imputed never-married population on the backward imputation and interaction terms of age dummies and dummies for years since the last Census, using the data after 1980 and separately for each prefecture, to get the predicted never-married population for years prior to 1980 based on the backward imputation. The underlying assumption is that the difference between the forward and backward imputations depends only on the age and how far the last Census was.
A2 Identification of each woman's children
To identify the year of child births, we made several important assumptions. First, we follow children up to 17 years old, assuming they live with their mother. The reason for this assumption is that 18 is the age when people graduate from high school and start leaving their parents' home in Japan. This assumption is probably tolerable because about 97% of 16 and 17 year-olds in the sample are children or grand children of household heads. The fraction of heads and wives increases from less than 3% at the age of 15-17 to 12.7% at the age of 18, and it keeps growing with the age thereafter. Regarding the measurement errors due to divorce, the probability of divorce within 15 years since marriage is about 20% in Japan.
18
Once divorced, the custody went to the mother for 75% of the cases of divorces that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, according to the Vital Statistics Report. Taking into account that the probability of divorce is higher at the initial stage of marriage before the couple has a child, roughly speaking, the fraction of children whose step-mother is misidentified as their biological mother is at most 5 %. Then, for each woman in the sample who was 18-62 years old at the time of survey, we tried to determine her children's age by the following process.
1) If there were not any children in the household, all adult women in the household are assumed not to have any children younger than 17.
2) If she was the only adult woman younger than 62 in the household and all children were born in the periods when she was fertile, they are assumed to be her children.
3) If there is more than one adult woman younger than 62 in the household, we check the age differences between each adult woman and the children. Then, if the following conditions were satisfied for one of the women, all children in the household are assumed to be her children and the other women in the household are assumed not to have any children younger than 17.
i. She has married (incl. already divorced/widowed)
ii. All children was born when she was 18-45 years old
iii. None of the children was born when the other women in the household were 18-45 years old.
Up to this point, about 97% of the women who were 18-62 years old at the time of survey are identified as either a mother of all children in the household or not having any children younger than 17.
For the remaining 3%, we further go on the following speculation:
4) For all pairs of a child and an adult woman in the household, we checked whether the 24 child was born when the woman was 18-62 years old. Then, if every child in the household has only one woman in the household who could be his/her mother, the woman is assumed to be the child's mother.
5) If the process 4) still can't identify the mother of children, we checked if the women in the household are a pair of mother and daughter(s). If so, then i.
If the youngest child in the household was born when the mother was older than 45, we guess all children are the younger woman's. That is, the older woman is a grandmother of the children. To avoid contradiction, we check whether the oldest child was born after the daughter got 18 years old.
ii.
If the oldest child in the household was born when the younger woman was younger than 18, we guess all children in the household are the older woman's. That is, the younger woman is a sister of the children. To avoid contradiction, we check whether the youngest child was born before the mother got to be 45 years old.
Appendix Table A1 shows how many are identified as each category.
A3 The effect of the unemployment rate on education and geographical mobility
If the educational attainment is affected by the unemployment rate, such endogeneity may bias our result. Thus we estimated the effect of the unemployment rate at the age of 18 on (1) the probability of not finishing high school, (2) the probability of going to either junior college or four-year college, and (3) the probability of going to four year college. As shown in the Appendix Table A2 , the effect is small and not statistically significant for women. At the same time, the effect is not negligible for men in the ESS. This is one of the reasons why we do not use data of men.
In order to assign the unemployment rate at graduation to each cohort or individual, we had to use the region of current residence as a proxy for the region of residence at the time of 25 graduation. Since the ESS ask whether the respondent had moved since the year prior to the survey, we can calculate the annual rate of across-region migration. It is about 1.2% for women with high school or less education, 2.1% for those with junior college education, and 3.7% for those with four year college education. It is true that more educated people are more likely to move across regions, but such a difference should not affect the sign of the effect estimated by education. It would be more problematic if the effect of unemployment rate on mobility were different across educational back ground. Appendix Table A3 shows that the previous year's unemployment rate has a positive effect on migration where as the unemployment rate at graduation has a negative effect. The existence of such effects is a concern, but the effects are not much different across educational background. Appendix Table A3 also shows the effect for men, which is larger and quite different across educational background. This is another reason why we give up using data of men.
A4 Estimation without fixed effects
Although we believe that controlling for year-and region-fixed effects is necessary for identification, it would be informative to present estimates without such controls. Appendix Table A4 replicates Table 5a without such fixed effects. The estimates are not statistically significant, which implies that the weak effects we have found are not due to adding too many fixed effects.
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A5 Estimation with the job opening to vacancy ratio
The job opening to vacancy ratio is another popular index of labor market conditions in Japan. Thus we replaced the unemployment rate with the job opening to vacancy ratio and replicate Table 5a . As shown in Appendix Table A5 , although the effect of previous year's job openings to vacancy ratio is not statistically significant, the effect of graduation year's job openings to vacancy ratio has a consistent sign (note that a positive job openings to vacancy ratio means a boom, so the signs of coefficients should be opposite to those in Table 5a ). Note: all regressions include dummies for education (high school graduates vs less, junior college vs four year college), region, and year of graduation. Standard errors in the brackets are clustered by region. Note: Linear regression using birth year-prefecture level panel. Each observation is weighted by female population of the birth year-prefecture cohort. All regressions include dummies for prefecture and dummies for birth year. Standard errors in the brackets are clustered by region. 
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